Nuclear Security Regulations (SOR/2000-209)

Exemption From Licence Requirement

• 6 (1) A person may, without a licence to carry on that activity, transport Category I, II or III nuclear material within an area in which the material is required by section 7 to be processed, used or stored.

• (2) For greater certainty, the exemption established in subsection (1) relates only to the activity specified in that subsection and does not derogate from the licence requirement imposed by section 26 of the Act in relation to other activities.

General Obligations Relating to Category I, II or III Nuclear Material

Areas for Processing, Use and Storage of Category I, II or III Nuclear Material

• 7 (1) Every licensee shall process, use and store Category I nuclear material in an inner area.

• (2) Every licensee shall process, use and store Category II nuclear material in a protected area.

• (3) Every licensee shall process, use and store Category III nuclear material in

  • (a) a protected area;

  • (b) an area that is under the direct visual surveillance of the licensee; or

  • (c) an area to which access is controlled by the licensee and that is designed and constructed to prevent persons from gaining unauthorized access to the Category III nuclear material by using hand-held tools.

Requirements Concerning Category III Nuclear Material

• 7.1 (1) Subject to subsection (2), if a licensee processes, uses or stores Category III nuclear material in an area referred to in paragraph 7(3)(c), the licensee shall ensure that the area is equipped with devices that

  • (a) detect any intrusion into it;

  • (b) detect any unauthorized removal of Category III nuclear material;

  • (c) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices to malfunction or cease to function; and

  • (d) when an event referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible to a person in the service of the licensee or of an alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee.

• (2) A licensee need not comply with subsection (1) if it takes physical protection measures in respect of the area that provide the same level of protection as the devices referred to in that subsection.

Arrangements with Off-site Response Force

• 7.2 (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at an area where Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

• (2) The arrangements shall include provisions for

  • (a) annual familiarization visits by members of the off-site response force to the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored; and

  • (b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

• (3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

Requirements for High-security Sites

General Obligations

Application

7.3 Sections 7.4 to 38 apply in respect of high-security sites.

Design Basis Threat Analysis

• 7.4 (1) The Commission shall establish a design basis threat analysis and update it as necessary to incorporate changes to the design basis threat.

• (2) The Commission shall provide the current design basis threat analysis to every licensee, who shall take that analysis into account in the design of their physical protection system and make modifications to that system as necessary.

Facility-specific Threat and Risk Assessment

• 7.5 (1) Every licensee shall conduct, at least once every 12 months, a threat and risk assessment specific to a facility where it carries on licensed activities in order to determine the adequacy of its physical protection system.

• (2) Every licensee shall make modifications to its physical protection system, as necessary, to counter any credible threat identified as a result of the threat and risk assessment.

• (3) Every licensee shall keep a written record of each threat and risk assessment that it conducts.

• (4) Every licensee shall provide a copy of the written record, together with a statement of actions taken as a result of the threat and risk assessment, to the Commission within 60 days after completion of the assessment.

Location of Nuclear Power Plants

8 Every nuclear power plant shall be located within a protected area.

Requirements Concerning Protected, Inner and Vital Areas

Barrier Enclosing Protected Area

• 9 (1) Every protected area shall be enclosed by a barrier that is located at its perimeter.

• (2) Subject to subsection (3), the barrier shall be designed and constructed to inhibit any unauthorized entry into the protected area and must be one or a combination of the following structures:

  • (a) a fence at least 2.4 m in height constructed of wire chain links made of wire not smaller than gauge number 11, having openings whose sides do not exceed 6 cm in length, and topped with at least three strands of barbed wire or barbed tape installed parallel to the fence on brackets angled outward;

  • (b) a wall at least 2.4 m in height, including any wall that forms part of a building, constructed of steel, wood, concrete, masonry or other substantial material or composites of such materials and, if it does not form part of a building, topped with at least three strands of barbed wire or barbed tape installed parallel to the wall on brackets angled outward; or

  • (c) a structure that provides the same level of protection as those referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).

• (3) For facilities in respect of which a construction licence is issued after the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force, the barrier must be designed and constructed to inhibit unauthorized entry into the protected area and must consist of

  • (a) the following elements, namely,

    • (i) an exterior fence extending at least 3 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a),

    • (ii) an interior fence extending at least 2.4 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a), and

    • (iii) a separation of not less than 5 m between the two fences that is free of obstructions, other than guard posts, vehicle portals and intrusion detection and assessment devices; or

  • (b) a structure, whether or not combined with other physical protection measures, that provides the same level of protection as the structures referred to in paragraph (a).

• (4) Despite subsection (3), permanent security facilities such as guard posts and vehicle portals may join with the exterior and interior fences provided that a continuous barrier is maintained.

• (5) The interior fence referred to in subparagraph (3)(a)(ii) is considered to be the perimeter of the protected area.

• (6) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the barrier shall be constructed so that it can be closed and locked.

• (7) Those means of entry or exit shall be kept closed and locked except when persons or land vehicles are entering or exiting the protected area under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer.

Entry of Land Vehicles into Protected Area

• 9.1 (1) Every licensee shall ensure that vehicle portals are used for the entry and exit of land vehicles into and from a protected area.

• (2) The gates of a vehicle portal shall not be open at the same time, except if required in the event of an emergency.

• (3) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a protected area unless there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

• (4) Every licensee shall implement physical protection measures necessary to reduce the risk of forced land vehicle penetration of a protected area.

Unobstructed Area Surrounding Protected Area

• 10 (1) Every protected area shall be surrounded by an unobstructed area located on both sides of the barrier described in section 9 that extends at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier.

• (2) The unobstructed area shall be

  • (a) free of any structure, equipment or other obstruction that could be used to penetrate or surmount the barrier or to restrict observation of the unobstructed area; and

  • (b) continuously and uniformly illuminated at an intensity sufficient to permit clear observation of any person within the unobstructed area.

• (3) Paragraph (2)(a) does not apply to structures in place on the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force provided that appropriate physical protection measures are taken to maintain the integrity of the barrier described in section 9.

Protected Area Intrusion Detection

11 Every protected area shall be

• (a) equipped with devices that

  • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into the protected area,

  • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

  • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and that can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer, and

  • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm; or

• (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

  • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room, and

  • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room.

Location of Inner Area

12 Every inner area shall be located within a protected area.

Structure or Barrier Enclosing Inner Area

• 13 (1) Every inner area shall be totally enclosed by a structure or barrier that is designed and constructed to prevent, alone or in combination with other structures or barriers, persons from completing both of the following actions before an on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention:

  • (a) gaining unauthorized access to Category I nuclear material by using hand-held tools, weapons or explosive substances; and

  • (b) removing the nuclear material from the inner area.

• (2) The structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be located at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier that encloses the protected area.

• (3) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be kept closed and locked with a device that, from outside the structure or barrier, can only be unlocked by two persons authorized under section 18, using two different keys or combinations at the same time.

• (4) No person authorized to enter an inner area under section 18 shall enter that area unless at least one other person authorized to enter the area enters and remains in the area at the same time.

• (5) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter an inner area except when there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

Inner Area Intrusion Detection

14 Every inner area shall be

• (a) equipped with devices that

  • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into, and unauthorized movement within and out of, the inner area,

  • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

  • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off two independent continuous alarm signals each of which is both audible and visible, one in the security monitoring room that can be stopped only from that room by a nuclear security officer, and the other in at least one other attended place outside the inner area that can be stopped only from that place by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area under section 18, and

  • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm; or

• (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

  • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and in at least one other attended place outside the inner area, and

  • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room or by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area in accordance with section 18 from another attended place outside the inner area.